DUCKPOND

The leaving of Iraq will not be like the leaving of Vietnam, or if it is, it will be a greater strategic disaster and loss of reputation for the United States. The leaving of Vietnam was left too long resulting in unnecessary deaths, and the same can be confidently said for Iraq. Underlying both situations is the stubbornness that if the US just holds out it will prevail. It could be argued that the stakes are higher in Iraq than they were in Vietnam. I suspect that the Iraq occupation cannot be sustained, and the point has now being reached where the costs, material and immaterial, tangible and intangible, clearly outweigh the benefits. One legacy will be the alienation of the Arab and greater Islamic World.

Still the situation is paradoxical. The US Administration will argue that withdrawal, or even a timetable for withdrawal will signal a victory for terrorism, and that victory may be unavoidable. If the terrorists win a victory it will be due to the US overstretch. A timetable is the best option to signal the withdrawal of the US presence and the assumption of full political authority by the Iraqi Government. A timetable would be far preferable to a collapse and retreat as experienced by the Russians in Afghanistan.

The specific differences of Iraq and Vietnam are interesting to consider.

The professional army has been undermined in Iraq, whereas in a conscript army largely fought the Vietnam and generated widespread protest led by the most affected target population. In this respect the spectre of Vietnam hovers over Iraq, even as it is written out of the story. The organizational culture of the army designed for intelligent decentralization has been infected by heavy-handed top-down control, the lowering of entry standards, and the use of highly paid, mercenary contractors.

In Vietnam there was a broadly united resistance movement closely aligned to the North Vietnam government. Withdrawal meant the unification of Vietnam which was nationalist purpose which had grown out of colonization. The Vietnamese army was subsequently able to overthrow Pol Pot and fight a border war with China. By contrast in Iraq the invasion and the overthrow of the existing government has fragmented the Sunnis, Shia and Kurds, which has the potential to cause wider fragmentation and conflagration in the Middle East. Following a withdrawal, the chances of neighbouring countries sending military forces into Iraq is almost pre-ordained. The Turks are unlikely to tolerate the existence of an independent Kurdist state. The Saudis will be concerned about their minority Shia population, and the Iranians may stand ready to support their co religionists. Such complications did not exist in Vietnam.

The Neo-Cons might have been able to lie about oil as a reason for invading Iraq, but access to oil will be a major liability should the US be forced out. Vietnam was largely a strategic non-entity. The withdrawal of US forces did not result in the loss of strategic leverage.

Background – Google Links:

Leslie H. Gelb and Richard K. Betts, We are not fighting to Lose, The Washington Post (14 January 2007).

David Kaiser, The Truth in the Details, History Unfolding -Blog-(01 April 2007.)

Juan Cole, How to get out of Iraq, The Nation (5 April 2007)

Arno J Mayer, Bush Bashing and the Empires Onward March, Counterpoint (7/8 April 2007)